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FIVE TRIBES' WATER RIGHTS: EXAMINING THE AAMODT
ADJUDICATIONS' MECHEM DOCTRINE TO PREDICT




The unique history between the Five Tribes of Oklahoma and the federal
government may provide a basis for greater recognition of the Five Tribes'
rights in land and natural resources than nearly all Indian tribes whose
rights have thus far been adjudicated. Based on a rubric known as the
Mechem Doctrine, developed through a general stream adjudication
regarding Pueblo water rights, an Indian tribe has water rights superior to
those expressed in Winters v. United States' when it: (1) holds its lands in
fee; (2) is protected under the jurisdiction of the federal government, as
promised in Congress's enabling acts; and (3) holds rights to water which
have never been diminished or abrogated by an act of Congress.2
All Oklahoma tribes have a claim at least equal to a Winters right, which
affords practicably irrigable acreage. In other words, Oklahoma tribes
have reserved water rights measured objectively by the acreage of
practicably irrigable reservation lands, as opposed to reasonably foreseeable
needs.4 But because of the similar histories between the Five Tribes and the
* J.D. 2011, University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.B.A. 2006, University of
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appreciation and praise to Stephen Greetham, University of Oklahoma College of Law
Adjunct Faculty Member, Chickasaw Nation's Special Counsel for water and natural
resources, and Chief General Counsel to the Chickasaw Nation's Division of Commerce, for
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1. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
2. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt (Aamodt Hl), 618 F. Supp. 993, 1009
(D.N.M. 1985).
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.01(b)(3) (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley
eds., 3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter WATERS]; see also L. Susan Work, Tribal Water Rights in
Eastern Oklahoma - The Inapplicability of General Principles Concerning State Water
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Pueblos, the Five Tribes are in a position to assert rights superior to Winters
rights - and possibly so much as the full ownership and regulatory control
of water resources within their boundaries. Because there are, as yet, no
adjudications specifically addressing any of the Five Tribes' water rights,
one must look west to similar adjudications to predict what the outcome
may be, and, more importantly, to make informed decisions with regards to
negotiations and possible litigation.
This article applies the background and analysis of a general stream
adjudication involving the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to water-related
issues facing the Five Tribes of Oklahoma. In addition to federal reserved
water rights principles, Part II illustrates relevant state water law principles
and processes. Part III details the similar histories of the Pueblos and the
Five Tribes. Part IV provides a synopsis of the Aamodt adjudications, and
uses the resulting doctrines to demonstrate the basis for and a theoretical
application of the Aamodt principles to the current water issues facing the
Five Tribes. This article concludes in Part V.
II. Relevant Water Law Concepts
A. General Water Law Principles
Two primary systems govern the distribution of surface water in
American jurisprudence: the riparian system and the prior appropriation
system. 6 Generally, a state applies one of the two systems to perfect water
rights within the respective state.7 Three exceptions exist, however, in
California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, which adopt a dual-system approach,
thereby applying both the riparian and prior appropriation systems
simultaneously.8
The 100th meridian is a vertical line running through the middle of North
Dakota and stretching into Texas, splitting the United States into the East
and West,9 but also splitting the doctrinal jurisdictions vis-a-vis water-
related legal regimes.10 More specifically, with respect to the water rights
Interests, SovEREIGNTY SYMPOSIUM XXII 2009 - LAND, WIND AND WATER II-14, 11-15 (June
2009), available at http://www.itecmembers.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-MOCOvunyOjY
%3D& tabid=3597&mid=6755.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See 1 WATERS, supra note 4, § 4.01.
7. See id § 4.05(a).
8. See id § 8.02.
9. DAviD H. GETCHEs, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 22 (4th ed. 2009).
10. Id. at 5-8, 22.
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system to which a given state adheres, it is generally true that the states east
of the 100th meridian (featuring a wet climate) adopt the riparian doctrine,
while states west of the 100th meridian (featuring a more arid climate)
adopt the prior appropriation doctrine."
For groundwater, states generally apply legal regimes separate from
riparianism or prior appropriation.' 2  While surface water, rather than
groundwater, is the principal focus of this article, it is important to note (for
purposes of differentiating the two) that Oklahoma defines groundwater as
"fresh water under the surface of the earth regardless of the geologic
structure in which it is standing or moving outside the cut bank of any
definite stream."" Through the application of this definition, one can
determine whether a surface water or groundwater rule applies.
1. Riparianism
A derivative of European law,' 4 the riparian system applies in the eastern
states, where water is more abundant and scarcity is not generally at issue.'s
In a riparian system, the right to use water derives from the ownership of
land.' 6 Only those lands touching or abutting surface water are riparian and
thereby capable of perfecting a right in water. 7 The reasonable use of the
water for domestic, agricultural, industrial, or natural uses (rather than a
temporal priority in the use of the water) defines the nature of one's right. 8
This right to reasonable use is correlative, in that it is subject to the rights of
the water source's other riparian users.19
2. Prior Appropriation
As westward expansion progressed, it became apparent that the riparian
system was ill-suited to accommodate the drier states - particularly the
riparian system's requirement that land abut the water, an implausible
11. 1 WATERS, supra note 4, § 4.05(a).
12. See id. § 4.05(c). Because the location of groundwater is mostly unknown, state
courts have historically resolved disputes in a context-specific manner and applied one of
five legal regimes: common law rule of capture, American reasonable use rule, correlative
rights, Restatement (Second) of Torts, or prior appropriation. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 415-19 (4th ed. 2006).
13. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.1 (2011).
14. 1 WATERS, supra note 4, § 7.01(a).
15. See id. § 8.01.
16. JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES WATER LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 36 (2009).
17. 1 WATERS, supra note 4, § 7.02(a).
18. Id. § 7.02(b)-(d).
19. Id. § 7.01.
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constraint for an arid climate requiring the off-tract use of water.20
Moreover, a majority of the lands in the West were owned by the federal
government and could not easily be purchased to acquire riparian water
rights. 21
Because of these practical challenges, the prior appropriation doctrine
was developed, requiring two elements to obtain an appropriation in water:
first, "diversion of water from a natural source," and second, "intent to
apply water to a beneficial use."22 The first element is often described as
the "first in time, first in right" rule: that is, "[tihe person who is first in
time to appropriate water is the first in right,"23 protecting the user against
later appropriators of the same water source. 24 The second element is often
described as the "use it or lose it" rule, validating the right to continue
appropriation for so long as the beneficial use continues.25
When the federal government disposes of land in a prior appropriations
state, the water rights are not conveyed to the purchaser. Rather, the water
rights are left to the respective state within which the water is located, and
thus a permit system is used to perfect or allocate water rights for private
use.26
3. Dual System
States along the 100th meridian, whose climate features an abundance
(or at least a significant amount) of water in the East but a more arid and
dry climate in the West, use both the riparian and prior appropriation
systems to accommodate the varying needs within the state.27 For the same
reasons, the states along the West Coast also adopt the dual-system
approach.
With the exception of California (which initially adopted the dual
system), the dual-system states first applied the riparian doctrine but then
later adopted the prior appropriation doctrine as well. 29  In most dual-
system states, the riparian rights established before the prior appropriation
system's adoption are essentially granted a priority in front of the later prior
20. Id. §§ 8.01, 11.01.
21. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 81.
22. See id. at 77 (emphasis omitted).
23. 1 WATERS, supra note 4, § 12.01.
24. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 81.
25. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 45.
26. See GETcHEs, supra note 9, at 148-60.
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appropriations.30 But in California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, riparians can
perfect new rights among the prior appropriators - even jumping their
priority in line.
B. Reserved Water Rights
Residual public domain lands, as well as lands reserved from disposition
or set aside by the federal government for a particular purpose are not
generally subject to state-adopted water law systems.32 Instead, these lands
are subject to the reserved rights doctrine.3 3
Water rights disputes involving Indian tribes usually revolve around the
tribe's reserved rights to water - that is, rights reserved by or for tribes in
the treaties, agreements, and other instruments that ceded aboriginal lands
and/or created reservations. 4 In Winters v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that, even without express language, an 1888 congressional
agreement (whereby the tribe ceded a large tract of land for a smaller
reservation) impliedly carried with it tribal rights to water.s
More specifically, the Court held that the government's reservation of
land for the Fort Belknap Tribe reserved with it the right to water from the
Milk River for three reasons. First, the Court examined the reasoning
surrounding the Tribe's cession of a large tract of land in exchange for a
smaller one. According to the Court, the government's policy was to
change the Indians from nomadic and uncivilized people to pastoral and
civilized people. The original large tract of land was too vast to achieve
30. See id. at 205-06.
31. Id. A riparian's ability to perfect new rights in front of a prior appropriator's rights
may prove irrelevant, however, in an analysis of Indian water rights. Because Indian water
rights are based in federal law, they would not be subject to a state law doctrine pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause. For an in-depth discussion of the complexities this form of dual
system creates vis-i-vis Indian Country, see Taiawagi Helton, Comment, Indian Reserved
Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L.J. 979 (1998).
32. GETCHES, supra note 9, at 332.
33. Id.
34. JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 396-401 (2002).
35. 207 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1908).
36. Id. at 576.
37. Id. The federal government's policy regarding tribes has vacillated since the time of
European conquest, shifting variably from separation to assimilation. At the time that the
Supreme Court decided Winters, federal sentiment favored allotment and assimilation,
stimulated in large part by the General Allotment Act, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2006)). See
Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
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this goal, and thus a smaller tract was required. But without irrigation, the
smaller tract was arid and practically valueless for the intended purpose.
For this reason, the Court inferred that the agreement impliedly reserved
water from the nearby Milk River along with the land, notwithstanding a
lack of express declaration.
Second, the canons of construction39 reinforce the Court's conclusion
that the parties must have intended to include the water with the reservation
of land. Referencing one of the canons, the Court wrote that "ambiguities
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.'4
Accordingly, even if Congress had no intention to reserve the water rights,
where there lacks clear and express language, the interpretation will be
construed in favor of the Indians. Because it was in the best interests of the
Indians, the Winters Court interpreted the agreement to the effect that water
rights were reserved.
Last, the Winters Court noted that the original, larger reservation
contained the Milk River to begin with, and that the Indians relied upon and
"had command" of it for their beneficial use.4 1 To give up this command
would again leave the land valueless, begging the question whether this was
an agreement with Congress or a forced cession of land with no benefit to
the tribe. The Court reasoned that the Indians surely did not "give up all
Consolidation Act, 85 IowA L. REV. 595, 597 (2000) ("In 1887, Congress passed the General
Allotment Act to privatize Indian reservations and advance the assimilationist sentiment of
the day. The Act divested land from tribes to their members, each of whom received a tract
of land on a wing and a prayer: become an autonomous Christian agrarian. With various
goals (benign and otherwise) in mind, the Act's proponents envisioned its transformative
ability to supplant communitarian tribal norms with the classical liberal virtues of self-
sufficiency, individuality and private ownership."). For an overview of the various policy
eras, see Benjamin W. Thompson, The De Facto Termination ofAlaska Native Sovereignty:
An Anomaly in an Era of Self-Determination, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 435-38 (1999-
2000) (noting that federal Indian policy shifted from the early trade and intercourse era, to
removal, to allotment and assimilation, to termination, and finally, to modem-era self-
determination).
38. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
39. Courts have long recognized that the unique trust relationship between the United
States and the Indians requires a specific set of rules when interpreting treaties. Specifically,
courts have articulated the canons to provide that absent explicit statutory language,
Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690
(1979), treaties are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943), with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit, Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
40. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
4 1. Id.
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this," nor were they "awed by the power of the Government or deceived by
its negotiators."4 2
Winters considered reserved water rights implied from the creation of
reservations for the purpose of new uses. Likewise, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Winans43 recognized similar water rights reservations for
existing uses (such as fishing), known as aboriginal rights." In Winans, the
Court reasoned that rights not expressly stated in the treaty remain with the
tribe. "In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of rights from them - a reservation of those not granted."45
Courts use the Winans and Winters decisions to distinguish whether
water rights are "reserved" or "aboriginal" at the time of the treaty's
establishment.4 But both doctrines recognize water rights in an Indian
tribe. The distinction lies in whether the purpose of the reservation was for
new or existing rights.4 7  For example, in Winans, the purpose for the
reservation of rights was to maintain hunting and fishing rights, two
activities practiced by the tribe for many years.48 In contrast, in Winters,
the reservation of rights was for the purpose of establishing a new right -
rights in irrigation and farming.49 The distinction between reserved and
aboriginal rights is important for quantification and basis-of-law issues in
the Aamodt adjudications, as well as all general stream adjudications
involving Indian tribes.50
42. Id.
43. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
44. Id. at 381.
45. Id.
46. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1172-73 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.




50. See generally Paul Bossert et al., Rio Jemez Background Papers on the Adjudication
Proceeding and Water Rights Issues, UTToN TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES CTR., UNIV. OF
N.M. SCH. OF LAW (Fall 2004), http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/RioJemezBackground
Papers.pdf. A stream system adjudication is the judicial determination of the quantity and
priority of all individual water rights to a common source of water. Id. at 1. Once a stream
adjudication suit is filed, either by a private party or the state, the court joins all known
claimants and those who can be reasonably ascertained. See id. The adjudicating court has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of all rights within the entire
stream system. Upon completion of the trial, the court issues a decree, which declares the
following things for each water right adjudged to each party: priority, amount, purpose,
periods and place of use, and, in irrigation contexts, specific tracts of land to which the right
shall be appurtenant. See id. at 6-7.
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III. A History and Comparison of the Pueblos and the Five Tribes
A. The Pueblos
Archeological evidence of the Puebloss' in what is today known as the
Four Corners area (New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, and Arizona) dates back
to 10,000 B.C.5 2 In the thirteenth century, on account of drought, erosion,
and famine, the Pueblos migrated to an area with more stable water
supplies - the Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico. 3
Artifacts dating back to this time provide evidence of the Pueblos
existence as a stationary, highly adaptive tribe, dependent on irrigated
agriculture as the lifeblood of village economic activity.5 4 The Pueblos'
storied history as a tribe living off the land, as well as their encounters with
the Spanish, Mexican, and American governments beginning in the
sixteenth century, defined and shaped their unique legal history into what it
is today.
1. Spanish Rule over the Pueblos
In the early sixteenth century, members of the Zuni Pueblo Tribe came
upon four men - all notably dissimilar in complexion from the Pueblos -
wandering through their lands.5 The men had wandered from the Gulf of
Mexico for eight years after being the only survivors of a sunken Spanish
vessel. 6 This encounter was the first interaction between the Pueblos and
the Spanish.57
The foreigners eventually made their way back to colonized Mexico,
telling the Spanish Viceroy of their journey and the splendor they
discovered.s These tales ultimately inspired Francisco Coronado's 1540
expedition for the Seven Cities of Gold.59 Ravaging through the Pueblo
lands for riches, he and his soldiers waged violence against those who
51. SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTs 27, 162 (1989)
(explaining that "Pueblos" derived from the word "villages" and represents what we know
today as the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico).
52. JOE S. SANDO, THE PUEBLO INDIANS XIII (1976); CHARLES R. CUTrER, THE
PROTECTOR DE INDIOS IN COLONIAL NEW MExIco, 1659-182 1, at 22 (1986).
53. CUTTER, supra note 52, at 22.
54. Id. at 22-23.
55. O'BRIEN, supra note 51, at 163.
56. Id.
57. SANDO, supra note 52, at 41-46.
58. O'BRIEN, supra note 51, at 163-64.
59. Id. at 164.
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resisted their occupation.6" With the expedition a disappointment,
Coronado and his soldiers departed from the Pueblo lands and returned to
Mexico empty-handed.6'
It was not until the very late sixteenth century that Spanish rule over the
Pueblos began. In 1598, Juan de Onate led a group of colonists from
Mexico into the Pueblo lands, claiming 150,000 acres in the name of
Spain.62 The Spanish forced the Pueblos to adopt Catholicism, as well as a
system of Spanish laws. By protecting the Pueblo landholdings, the
Spanish legal system distinguished the stationary Pueblos from that of the
nomadic Apaches and Navajos.63 The Spanish "viewed the Pueblos as
wards of the Spanish Crown, restricted sales of their lands, forbade non-
Indian settlement on Pueblo lands, and provided legal assistance.""
Moreover, Spanish statutory laws provided that Indians had prior rights to
all streams, rivers, and other waters that crossed or bordered their lands.
Despite Spain's protection and recognition of the Pueblos' property
rights, Spanish encroachment (which continued until 1821) proved
devastating to the Pueblos. Overgrazing of Spanish livestock resulted in
soil erosion, water shortages, and lack of food." Moreover, "[a]ny Pueblo
resistance to Spanish rule was met with brutal repression."67 In one such
retaliation, "Spanish soldiers burned the pueblo, executed a large number of
men, and amputated one foot of all survivors."68 Village raids instigated by
the Apaches and Navajos further compounded the strife between the
Pueblos and the Spanish government. Ultimately, the Pueblos' population
dwindled from approximately 60,000 prior to Coronado's expedition to a
mere 10,000 by 1821.9
2. Mexican Rule over the Pueblos
"In 1821, Mexico won its independence from Spain." 7 0  Mexico's
"revolutionary government . . . declared that 'all the inhabitants of New
60. Id.
61. Id. at 164-65.
62. Id. at 164.
63. See COHEN, supra note 46, at 320; CHARLES T. DUMARS ET AL., PUEBLO INDIAN
WATER RIGHTS: STRUGGLE FOR A PRECIOUs RESOURCE 17-23 (1984).
64. See COHEN, supra note 46, at 320-21; DUMARS ET AL., supra note 63, at 17-23.
65. See DuMARs ET AL., supra note 63, at 23.




70. COHEN, supra note 46, at 321.
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Spain .. . are citizens of this monarchy,' and that 'the person and property
of every citizen will be respected and protected by the government."' 7 1
Mexico's law recognizing Pueblo land rights was similar to that of Spain,
including Mexico's prohibition of non-Indian settlement on Pueblo lands.
The recognition of the Pueblos' prior rights in the water thus remained.
With respect to strife and intrusion, the time during which Mexico ruled
the Pueblos could be characterized as uneventful, paling in comparison to
Spain. "In 1846, the United States took possession of New Mexico during
the war with Mexico and established a territorial government,"7 2 thereby
ending Mexico's rule over the Pueblos.
3. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo & the Trade and Intercourse Act
In 1848, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, New Mexico residents
were given the choice to retain their Mexican citizenship by declaring their
intention to do so within a year from the date of exchange of ratifications.
"[T]hose who shall remain in the said territories after the expiration of that
year, without having declared their intention to retain the character of
Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become citizens of the
United States."7 The people were immediately given "free enjoyment of
their liberty and property." 74  Because Mexico had recognized Pueblo
Indians as citizens in 1821 and because Mexican citizens now had the
opportunity to be United States citizens, it follows that those Pueblos who
remained in their territory thereby became United States citizens. "Not a
single Pueblo Indian elected to retain Mexican citizenship.""
This transfer of citizenship created a host of questions regarding whether
the Pueblos retained their status as Indians, as well as their rights to
protection by the United States. In 1851, Congress extended the Trade and
Intercourse Act76 over the Indian tribes of New Mexico, which protected
them against trespass and prohibited settlers from entering or settling on
Indian lands.n But in 1869, a New Mexico territorial court rendered a
71. Id. (citing United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525, 538 (1855); Territory v. Delinquent
Taxpayers, 76 P. 307, 308 (N.M. 1904)).
72. Id.
73. SANDO, supra note 52, at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 71.
76. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (2006)). The Trade and Intercourse Act is also commonly referred to as the
Non-Intercourse Act. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 14
(5th ed. 2009).
77. See CANBY, JR., supra note 76, at 14.
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decision that would deprive the Pueblo Indians of the Trade and Intercourse
Act's protections. The court found the Pueblos different from the "wild,
wandering savages" Congress intended the Act to protect.79 Rather, the
Pueblos were "the most law-abiding, sober, and industrious people of New
Mexico."so
Through various acts, Congress consistently tried to afford Pueblos the
same judicial protections as other tribes. 1 But in United States v. Joseph,8 2
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the territorial court's decision that the
Pueblos were exempt from the Trade and Intercourse Act.83 Following
these decisions, "non-Indians acquired Pueblo land holdings through sale,
adverse possession, delinquent taxes, and other methods."84
In retaliation to these decisions, Congress passed the Enabling Act in
1910. The Enabling Act granted New Mexico statehood, but only under the
conditions that the State prohibit the introduction of liquor into Indian
Country and that it require citizens of the state to disclaim title to lands
owned or held by Indians or Indian tribes.85 Additionally, Congress defined
the terms "Indian" and "Indian Country" to include the Pueblo Indians of
New Mexico and the lands they owned or occupied. And, in United
States v. Sandoval,87 "the Supreme Court upheld Congress's decision in the
Enabling Act to include the Pueblos as Indians under federal control."
Moreover, "[t]he Court also noted that the Constitution expressly authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes," and that "the United
States has the power and duty of exercising a fostering care and protection
over all dependent Indian communities within its borders."89
4. Pueblo Lands Act 1924 and Pueblo Compensation Act 1933
Following the Enabling Act and the Sandoval decision, Congress
responded with the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, attempting to compensate
78. SANDO, supra note 52, at 73.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 72 (discussing United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422 (1869)).
81. See CANBY, JR., supra note 76, at 14.
82. 94 U.S. 614 (1876).
83. Id. at 617-18.
84. COHEN, supra note 46, at 324.
85. New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558 (1910); COHEN, supra
note 46, at 324-25.
86. New Mexico Enabling Act § 2, 36 Stat. at 560; COHEN, supra note 46, at 324-25.
87. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
88. COHEN, supra note 46, at 325.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Pueblos with "the fair market value of the lost land and water rights" for
the period between 1848 (when the United States took control of New
Mexico) and 1910 (when the Enabling Act recognized Pueblos as Indians
deserving protection).90 But the board established for processing this
compensation did not believe that the Pueblos had lost water rights to lands
acquired by non-Indians, and only compensated the Pueblos for one-third of
the fair market value. 91
"In 1933, Congress enacted the Pueblo Compensation Act ... raising the
level of compensation to full fair market value" to make up for the other
two-thirds not previously compensated.92 Additionally, the Act stipulated
that "Pueblo water rights cannot be lost by non use or abandonment .. . as
long as title to said lands shall remain in the Indians." Therefore, the "use
it or lose it" element ordinarily applied under the prior appropriation
doctrine would not apply in this case, or theoretically, in any case where
Indian lands were purchased or somehow divested.
B. Five Tribes' History
The following discussion details the Five Tribes' history, their removal
to Indian Territory, and the allotment of their lands, as well as the details
surrounding Oklahoma's admission as a state as it applies to the Five Tribes
and their water rights. All of these factors taken as a whole fit within the
rubric set by the Aamodt court to give the Five Tribes water rights
amounting to something greater than a Winters right.
The following sentences establish the rubric set forth in the Aamodt
adjudications. First, the tribes retained their lands in fee simple through the
removal treaties. Second, both the tribes and the United States intended
that the reserved lands would never be subject to any state or territorial
organized government. 94 Third, no event since the tribes' removal to the
Indian Territory changed these rights with regards to water.95 As the
following sections establish, the Five Tribes' historical land tenure fits
seamlessly within this rubric.
90. Id. at 331.
91. Id. at 332.
92. Id. (citing Pueblo Compensation Act, ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108 (1933)).
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id.




1. Andrew Jackson's Removal Policy and the Resulting Removal Treaties
with the Five Tribes
The Five Tribes of Oklahoma, whose lands today comprise the eastern
portions of Oklahoma, originally occupied portions of Mississippi, Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama.96  It was President Jackson's forceful policy to
remove the Choctaw Indians from Mississippi that marked the beginning of
the Five Tribes' removal from the southeastern parts of the United States to
the Indian Territory, or what is today known as Oklahoma.97
In 1828, the year of Andrew Jackson's presidential election, an estimated
23,400 Indians remained in Mississippi - "almost as many Indians as all
states of the North combined."98 If the federal government were able to
relocate the Indians, "Mississippi - because of its superior cotton lands -
could become one of the greatest and richest states in the country." 99
Ignoring Supreme Court decisions recognizing Indian tribes as "domestic
dependent nations" and wards of the federal government, 00 President
Jackson affirmed the removal policy on December 8, 1829, in his inaugural
message to Congress. Jackson's removal policy declared that if the
Choctaws wished to retain their tribal lands and identity, they must accept
lands west of the Mississippi river in exchange for their current lands in
Mississippi.'01 A "voluntary" move west of the Mississippi River would
allow the Choctaws to remain "free of white men."l 02 Remaining east of
the Mississippi River, however, meant becoming subject to the laws of the
United States.'0o
Hopes of removing the Choctaws from Mississippi began long before
President Jackson's inauguration. In 1801, the Choctaws signed the first
96. GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES OF INDIANS 21, 107, 229, 315 (1972); see also COHEN, supra note 46, at 294-95.
97. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 117 (1970).
98. ARTHUR H. DEROSIER, JR., THE REMOVAL OF THE CHOCTAW INDIANS 100 (1st ed.
1970).
99. Id.
100. See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (recognizing
the tribes as "domestic dependent nations" and affirming the existence of a guardian/ward
relationship between the tribes and the federal government); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (concluding that the State of Georgia had no authority within Cherokee
territory).
101. DEROSIER, JR., supra note 98, at 100-04.
102. Id. at 104.
103. See id.
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treaty dispossessing them of portions of their Mississippi lands.'" Through
a series of treaties (ending in 1830 with the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit
Creek), the Choctaws were entirely dispossessed of their homeland,
consisting of more than 23 million acres, and removed west of the
Mississippi River to lands consisting of only 13 million acres.105 That final
and most fateful treaty did not come without extensive negotiations.
Although they lacked much in the way of bargaining power, the Choctaws
did not agree to the treaty until it included provisions conveying the new
lands in fee simple, guaranteeing that the United States would never possess
the new lands, and affirming that the Choctaws would not be subject to
state laws. 06 After signing the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek and "more
than thirty years of negotiations, the Choctaws had been persuaded to
relinquish their precious homeland and emigrate to a new Indian territory in
the west."
07
In keeping with the policy of complete Indian removal, the United States
negotiated with the Creek Tribe to trade its lands in Alabama for lands west
of the Mississippi River. The negotiators assured the Creeks that removal
was the only way to escape the atrocities inflicted upon them by the white
settlers trying to appropriate their homelands. 08  For fear of continued
104. VALERIE LAMBERT, CHOCTAW NATION: A STORY OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESURGENCE
39 (2007).
105. Id.; see also DEROSIER, JR., supra note 98, at 29.
106. See DEROSIER, JR., supra note 98, at 121-25; FOREMAN, supra note 96, at 29.
Specifically, Article IV of the treaty provided:
The government and people of the United States, are hereby obliged to secure
to the said Choctaw nation of red people the jurisdiction and government of all
the persons and property that may be within their limits West, so that no state
or territory shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the
Choctaw nation of red people and their descendents: and that no part of the land
granted them shall ever be embraced in any territory or state, but the United
States shall forever secure said Choctaw nation from and against all laws,
except such as from time to time may be enacted in their national councils, not
inconsistent with the constitution, treaties and laws of the United States; and
except as may and which have been enacted by Congress to the extent that
Congress under the constitution are required to exercise a legislation over
Indian affairs. But the Choctaws, should this treaty be ratified, express a wish
that Congress may grant to the Choctaws the rights of punishing by their own
laws, any white man who shall come into their nation, and infringe any of their
national regulations.
Treaty with the Choctaws of 1830, art. 4, 7 Stat. 333, 333-34 (Treaty of Dancing Rabbit
Creek).
107. DEROSIER, JR., supra note 98, at 128.




murders, robberies, and frauds, the Creeks signed the Treaty of 1832,
sacrificing their homeland in exchange for a promised safer existence in the
Indian Territory.109 Like the Choctaws' removal treaty, the Creeks' treaty
also included provisions ensuring that the new lands be vested in fee
simple, as well as freedom from state interference. "o
President Jackson's forced removal policy "resulted in several years of
war with the Seminoles in Florida.""' Although the removal treaty with
the Seminoles was signed in 1832, the forced removal to Indian Territory
did not actually begin until 1839 because of the war.1 2 But it was not until
1856 that the Seminoles owned their own lands."" In the meantime, they
were forced to settle among the Creeks.14 The 1856 Treaty between the
Seminoles, Creeks, and United States (whereby the Creeks ceded a portion
of their lands to the Seminoles) carried with it a provision similar to the
treaties with the other Five Tribes, forever exempting the territory from
cession by way of treaty without the consent of the ceding tribe."'
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
and Worcester v. Georgia describing the tribes as semi-sovereign nations
free from the rule of Georgia or the United States,'1 6 President Jackson
imposed his removal policy upon the Georgia Cherokees as well."' The
109. Id. at 111.
110. Id. ("The Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guaranteed to the
Creek Indians, nor shall any State or Territory ever have a right to pass laws for the
government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves, so far as may
be compatible with the general jurisdiction which Congress may think proper to exercise
over them. And the United States will also defend them from the unjust hostilities of other
Indians, and cause a patent or grant to be executed to the Creek tribe for their land.")
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. L. SusAN WORK, THE SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA: A LEGAL HISTORY 3
(2010).
112. Id. at 8-9.
113. Id. at 9.
114. Id.
115. Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles of 1856, art. 4, 11 Stat. 699, 700 ("The
United States do hereby, solemnly agree and bind themselves, that no State or Territory shall
ever pass laws for the government of the Creek or Seminole tribes of Indians, and that no
portion of either of the tracts of country defined in the first and second articles of this
agreement shall ever be embraced or included within or annexed to, any Territory or State,
nor shall either, or any part of either, ever be erected into a Territory without the full and free
consent of the legislative authority of the tribe owning the same.").
116. See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
117. In response to the Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, President Jackson
reportedly remarked, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" See
No. 1] 139
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Cherokees signed the Treaty of 1835, agreeing to cede their lands and
remove west of the Mississippi River. The federal government again
allowed a provision prohibiting future encroachment by any state or
territory.1
In 1832, a treaty was signed (although never ratified) between the
Chickasaws and the United States. The treaty called for the Chickasaws to
cede their lands in Alabama and Mississippi in exchange for portions of the
Choctaws' lands in the Indian Territory.' Because the Choctaws refused
to sell their lands and the Chickasaws refused to live on the lands as
cotenants, negotiations between the two stalled the Chickasaws' removal.12 0
But in 1837, through the Treaty at Doaksville, the Chickasaws, Choctaws,
and United States reached an agreement whereby the Chickasaws
purchased land from the Choctaws comprising the western portions of their
territory.121 It was through this treaty that the Chickasaws were removed to
lands west of the Mississippi River. And as with the treaties of the other
Five Tribes, the treaty promised that the Chickasaws' lands would never
become subject to another territory or state.12 2 The treaty provided that the
new Chickasaw land was "to be held on the same terms that the Choctaws
now hold it."23
2. The Allotment Period
In 1871, the United States ended its policy of making treaties with
tribes.124 But westward expansion by white settlers still required the United
States to reduce tribal landholdings.1 25 The policy for the acquisition of
Indian lands then became "civilization and assimilation," to be
accomplished through the allotment acts.126 The goals of allotment and
assimilation were two-fold: first, to civilize the Indians by forcing them to
Matthew L. Sundquist, Worcester v. Georgia: A Breakdown in the Separation of Powers, 35
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239, 246 n.65 (2010-2011).
118. Treaty with the Cherokees of 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 481 ("The United States
hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee nation in the foregoing
article shall, in no future time without their consent, be included within the territorial limits
or jurisdiction of any State or Territory.").
119. FOREMAN, supra note 96, at 196-97.
120. Id. at 200.
121. Id. at 203.
122. See Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw of 1837, art. 1, 11 Stat. 573, 573.
123. Id.
124. COHEN, supra note 46, at 75.
125. See id at 76.




adopt American lifeways (including farming on smaller plots of land), and
second, to sell the surplus lands no longer "needed" to white settlers.127
Through the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 (often referred to as the General
Allotment Act), Indian reservations were parceled into tracts to be divided
among tribal members.128 The lands would be distributed as follows: "160-
acre tracts to heads of families, 80 acres to unmarried adults, and 40 acres
to children." 29 The government would then purchase any remaining lands
from the tribes for homesteaders. 30
The Dawes Act applied only to those lands held in trust, or owned by the
federal government.' 3 ' Thus, the lands of the Five Tribes were not allotted
under the Act because they held their lands in fee pursuant to their
respective removal treaties.' 32 To remedy the government's inability to
allot the Five Tribes' land, Congress established the Dawes Commission in
an effort to negotiate with the tribes.'33 In 1898, after an unsuccessful five
years of negotiations, Congress passed the Curtis Act, which threatened the
Five Tribes with "forced allotment and termination of tribal judicial
authority and land ownership, unless the Tribe agreed to allotment."l34 The
Five Tribes then entered into separate agreements allowing individual
allotments, and the liquidation of their territories began.13
As opposed to the government deeding the allotments to the individual
allottees under the Dawes Act, the Five Tribes deeded the lands directly to
the allottees.13 6 Thus, the "Five Tribes' land ownership was not placed in
the United States and their lands did not become part of the public domain,
before or during the allotment process."'" Therefore, when the State of
Oklahoma entered the Union, it did not receive any grant of ownership over
these lands because the United States did not have any ownership to
transfer to it.138 Because allotment of the Five Tribes' lands did not give
the United States or the State of Oklahoma ownership of the Five Tribes'
127. Id.
128. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERs RuN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBEs 23 (paperback ed. 1984).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See Work, supra note 4, at II-25.
132. See id. at 11-23 to 25.
133. Id. at 11-25.
134. Id.
135. See generally DEBO, supra note 128, at 23-60.
136. Work, supra note 4, at 11-25 to 26.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 11-26.
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lands, it stands to reason that allotment of the Five Tribes' lands similarly
did not constitute a transfer of water rights to the United States or the State
of Oklahoma." 9 Along with the lack of implied transfer, there is no express
statement "in the allotment agreements relinquishing their water rights to
the future state."l 4 0
3. Oklahoma Becomes a Territory
a) The Organic Act of 1890
Until the Oklahoma Organic Act's 1890 enactment, the Indian Territory
to which the tribes were removed was never a part of an organized territory
of the United States.141 Pursuant to the Organic Act, lands from the western
portion of the Indian Territory were taken to form the Oklahoma Territory
with a territorial government of its own.14 2 But the eastern portion of
Indian Territory remained land of the Five Tribes. The eastern land was not
encompassed by the new Oklahoma Territory government, but instead by
the tribal governments.143
b) The Oklahoma Enabling Act and the Oklahoma Constitution
In 1906, Congress passed the Oklahoma Enabling Act to admit the
people of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory into the Union and to form a
constitution and a state government.'" Admitted to the Union in November
1907, "[t]he newly formed state was compelled to disclaim all right and
title to Indian lands, [] and the federal government expressly retained its
exclusive authority over Indian matters." 4 5 By prohibiting constructions of
the Constitution that could "limit or impair the [unextinguished] rights of
person or property pertaining to the Indians" of the newly formed territory,
the government was "careful to preserve the authority" that it had "over the
Indians [and] their lands .. . prior to the passage of the act." 46 Therefore, it
cannot be said that it was the federal government's intention that Oklahoma
would receive any rights in natural resources from the tribes or the United
States in entering the Union. This principle was affirmed in Choctaw
139. Id. at 11-25 to 26.
140. Id at 11-25.
141. Id at II-24.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 11-24 to 25.
144. Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
145. Helton, supra note 31, at 992-93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Work, supra note 4, at 11-28 (citing Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309 (1911)).
[Vol. 36142
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss1/2
EXAM7NING THE AAMODT ADJUDICA TIONS
Nation v. Oklahoma,147 in which the Court held that upon Oklahoma's entry
into the Union, the United States did not have title to convey to the beds of
the Arkansas River.14 8 Rather, title was previously conveyed to the tribes
through treaties with the United States.14 9
As Part IV details, based on a comparison to the previously adjudicated
Pueblo water rights and the application of the resulting rubric known as the
Mechem Doctrine, the special historical beginnings the Choctaws' and
Chickasaws' Oklahoma landholdings through unusual treaties and land
grants may provide for a greater recognition of their rights in water. While
never applied beyond the Aamodt adjudications, the application of the
Mechem Doctrine theoretically requires a tribe to: (1) hold its lands in fee;
(2) be protected under the jurisdiction of the federal government, as
promised in Congress's enabling acts; and (3) hold rights to water which
have never been diminished or abrogated by an act of Congress. Rather
than being held in trust by the federal government, the Five Tribes were
granted their lands in fee simple. Because that grant of land carried with it
rights in water which appear never to have been limited or diminished, an
application of the Mechem Doctrine may prove insightful to any inquiry
into or adjudication of the Five Tribes' water rights.
IV The Aamodt Adjudications: A Synopsis and an Application to the Five
Tribes'Disputes
A. The Aamodt Adjudications
1. The San Juan Chama Project: The Source of the Dispute Between the
Pueblos and the State ofNew Mexico
The Pojoaque Creek watershed, a tributary to the Rio Grande, includes
the Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, and Tesuque Pueblos. The watershed
lies between the Rio Grande on the west and Sangre de Cristo Mountains
on the east.so
Pursuant to the 1956 Colorado Storage Act, the Secretary of the Interior
was
authorized to construct, operate, and maintain the initial stage of
the San Juan-Chama project . . . for the principal purposes of
furnishing water supplies to approximately thirty-nine thousand
147, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
148. Id. at 635.
149. Id.
150. Aamodt II, 618 F. Supp. 993, 995 (D.N.M. 1985).
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three hundred acres of land in the Cerro, Taos, Llano, and
Pojoaque tributary irrigation units in the Rio Grande Basin ...
for municipal, domestic, and industrial uses, and providing
recreation and fish and wildlife benefits.' 5'
The units would receive their proposed new water by diversion from the
Rio Grande through the use of dams, diversions, canals, etc. 5 2  The
majority of the diverted water would be allocated to municipalities, such as
Albuquerque and Santa Fe, among others. 5 1
To properly account for and distribute the water, the State Engineer's
Office, in accordance with New Mexico Water Code, began inventories and
adjudications of existing water supplies and water rights in each of the
tributary watersheds. 5 4 "All except the project in the Rio Pojoaque Basin
were dropped because of local opposition or other factors."'
55
Subsequently, "[t]he Nambe Falls Dam was built in the upper part of that
watershed, and its storage reservoir now provides supplemental irrigation
water to the Pojoaque Valley Irrigation District and the pueblos of San
Ildefonso, Nambe and Pojoaque."' 6 This accounting and adjudication of
water rights would ultimately lead to the Aamodt litigation.'5 7
The San Juan-Chama Diversion project in New Mexico during the early
1960s proposed that water imported into the Rio Grande Basin be made
available to several separate watershed areas that feed into the Rio Grande,
including the Pojoaque River Basin. 58  For proper distribution and
accounting, the State Engineer's Office initiated water rights
adjudications.'" 9 This led to the State Attorney General's 1966 court filing
"for determination of rights to the use of the water of the Nambe-Pojoaque
River System.' 6 0  Filing in accordance with the New Mexico water
adjudication statute,16 the State named as defendants: the United States, as
151. San Juan-Chama Reclamation Project of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, § 8, 76 Stat. 96,
97-98.
152. Id. at 98.
153. See Aamodt Adjudication, UTrON TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES CTR., UNWv. OF
N.M. SCH. OF LAW, I (Dec. 2010), http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/WMAamodt.pdf
[hereinafter Aamodt Adjudication (Dec. 2010)].
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 1-2.
156. Id. at 2.
157. See id. at 3.
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id. at 2.
160. New Mexico v. Aamodt (Aamodt 1), 537 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1976).
161. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-21 (2011).
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the Pueblos' trustee or guardian and as owner of the Santa Fe National
Forest lying within the Rio Grande Basin; the four Pueblo tribes (San
Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, and Tesuque); and about 1,000 other non-
Indian claimants.16 2
2. New Mexico v. Aamodt (1976)
New Mexico v. Aamodt, commonly referred to as Aamodt I, was an
appeal from the district court's decision, which determined that Pueblo
rights are to be adjudicated under state law and denied the Pueblos a right to
163
private counsel beyond that provided by the U.S. Department of Justice.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the central
issues,16" including the district court's ruling that the Pueblos' rights to use
the water system were subject to New Mexico's appropriation laws. The
circuit court reversed the water rights issue for two reasons. First, the court
pointed to the United States v. Sandoval and United States v. Candelarial65
decisions to show that the federal government never relinquished its
guardian/ward relationship with the tribes.'66 Second, the court noted that
nothing in the acts of 1924 or 1933 abrogated the Pueblos' water rights.' 67
The court recognized the uniqueness of the form and history of Pueblo
land title.6 s But those differences have no effect on the federal
government's control and jurisdiction over the Pueblos, nor on the duty of
protection it owes them. The foundations of the federal government's
fiduciary role are well established. The United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.16 9 It also
gives the executive branch the power to make treaties.o70 Along with these
legislative directives, Justice Marshall's judicial characterization of the
fiduciary duty in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia was clear. Marshall
described Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" with relations to
the United States resembling "that of a ward to his guardian."' In Aamodt
I, the court of appeals confirmed this foundational principle as applicable to
the Pueblos by citing Sandoval, which held that the Pueblos enjoy the same
162. Aamodt I, 537 F.2d at 1105.
163. Id. at 1104.
164. Id.
165. 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
166. See Aamodtl , 537 F.2d at 1109, 1111.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1105.
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
170. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
171. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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protected status as the Indian tribes to which Justice Marshall originally
referred.172 The court of appeals pointed to the Sandoval Court, noting that
"the United States has treated the pueblos as requiring special consideration
and protection, like other Indian communities." 73 And, as the court of
appeals further noted, this protection was confirmed in Candelaria, which
found that 1934 Act's extension to "the Indian tribes" of New Mexico
applied to the Pueblos.174 Therefore, where the federal government serves
as trustee to the tribes, its jurisdiction and control remains, regardless of the
status of the given tribe's land.
Based on the district court's interpretation of Sandoval and Candelaria,
the court of appeals rejected the State of New Mexico's and non-Indian
claimants' argument that the Pueblos lost any rights they may have had to
water under the 1924 and 1933 acts quieting title to their lands and
compensating them accordingly. 75 And based on the 1924 and 1933 acts,
the court of appeals also rejected the State's argument that where those
rights were lost, any rights theretofore would be subject to New Mexico
appropriation law, as opposed to federal law. 7 6  The court of appeals
reasoned that increased compensation for the Pueblos in the 1933 Act was
not the result of a loss of reserved water rights, but instead because of an
error of the Lands Board under the 1924 Act. ' The additional
compensation was intended to replace lost land and water rights and to
construct new irrigation works.' 78 Moreover, a reading of section 9 of the
1933 Act confirms that Congress never intended to divest any rights:
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner be construed to
deprive any of the Pueblo Indians of a prior right to the use of
water from streams running through or bordering on their
respective pueblos for domestic, stockwater, and irrigation
purposes for the lands remaining in Indian ownership, and such
172. Aamodt I, 537 F.2d at 1109.
173. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1110.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1109-11 ("The error was a failure to recognize that, when the claims of non-
Indians were sustained, the Pueblos lost both lands and the water rights appurtenant thereto.
Litigation brought pursuant to the 1924 Act had resulted in decisions that appurtenant water
went with the land. Congress increased the awards to include the value of appurtenant
water."). See generally supra Part III.A.4 (providing a history of the 1924 Act).
178. Ed Newville, Comment, Pueblo Indian Water Rights: Overview and Update on the
Aamodt Litigation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 251, 256 (1989).
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water rights shall not be subject to loss by nonuse or
abandonment thereof as long as title to said lands shall remain in
the Indians. 179
The court of appeals then rejected the State's argument that the mention
of nonuse and abandonment would only be necessary where state
appropriation law applied, and therefore, Congress must have recognized
that state appropriation law did apply. 80 The court based its reasoning on
the 1910 Enabling Act, whereby the State of New Mexico disclaimed title
to lands "owned or held by any Indian or Indian Tribes and recognized with
respect to such land the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of
the United States."' 8 Moreover, it noted that any relinquishment by
Congress must be express, rather than implied.182 Nothing in the legislative
history points to any express relinquishment, and such a finding would
violate Congress's mandate in the 1933 Act. 183
In sum, the court of appeals recognized that the Pueblos held land and
water rights from prior sovereigns that the United States agreed to protect
under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgol 84 - a protection not unlike that
afforded to any other tribe under the guardian/ward relationship. Moreover,
neither that duty nor those rights were relinquished, and therefore, federal
law applied, rather than New Mexico state appropriation law. With these
conclusions, the court of appeals left for the district court on remand the
task of analyzing the legal basis, scope, and quantification standards of
those water rights, as well as whether they are based on Winters, laws of a
prior sovereign, or something else. 85 In other words, the court of appeals
directed the district court on remand to focus not on the existence of the
rights, but rather on the legal basis, scope, and quantification thereof.86
3. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt
On remand, Judge Mechem presided over New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds
v. Aamodt, commonly referred to as Aamodt JI.187 The task of analyzing the
legal basis, scope, and quantification standards of the water rights was a
179. Id. at 257 n.35.
180. Aamodt I, 537 F.2d at I110-11.
181. Id. at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1113.
184. Id. at 1111.
185. Newville, supra note 178, at 260.
186. Aamodt I, 537 F.2d at 1111.
187. Aamodt II, 618 F. Supp. 993, 995 (D.N.M. 1985).
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difficult one for the district court. It took nine years of extensive historical
and analytic research by a special master before Judge Mechem issued an
opinion.18 Judge Mechem held that the Pueblo Indians did not hold
reserved rights consistent with Winters, but instead held aboriginal title that
carried water rights prior and paramount to all others. 189
Judge Mechem quickly dispensed with the theory that Winters reserved
rights could apply to the Pueblos simply because they "were in their
possession and use long before the sovereignty of the United States or the
adoption of the Winters doctrine."l 90 He first made clear that the Pueblos'
lands and waters were not "reserved" by the Spanish, but were instead
"recognized" and protected by the Spanish (and subsequently by the
Mexicans).191 Judge Mechem noted that "reserved" is a term of art. 92 For
clarity, Judge Mechem added, "The Spanish government did not reserve
Pueblo lands in the same way the United States reserves public land for use
as an Indian reservation. It simply recognized them and protected them." 93
Judge Mechem's analysis left room for inference. Under his reasoning
(and to come to the conclusion that Winters does not apply), one must infer
that rights recognized by the prior sovereigns were the only rights
recognized by the United States. Further, one must also infer that the action
recognizing their rights under the prior sovereign (presumably the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Trade and Intercourse Act) lacked the purpose
of establishing a "reservation" - the foundational requirement necessary for
a reserved right.
Judge Mechem held that the legal basis for the Pueblos acquired water
right was its recognition under the prior laws of Spain and Mexico.' 94 He
adopted the special master's findings that:
[t]he water rights of the Pueblos, which were recognized and
protected by Spain and by Mexico, were defined as a prior and
paramount right to a sufficient quantity to meet their present and
future needs. Both Spain and Mexico used the flexible
repartimiento system for allocating waters, under which the
18 8. Id.
189. Id. at 996, 998.
190. Id. at 1010 (clarifying that Winters rights do exist on Pueblo lands set aside by
executive order, such as for the Nambe Pueblo in 1902, or by congressional reservation).
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quantities allocated were never final, and did not have the effect
of res judicata, but could be changed as needs changed.'9
While Judge Mechem looked to the prior laws and relevant
repartimiento196 to establish water rights under 1823's system, today's
courts will not use these laws as a means to allocate water rights, but
instead only as a basis for the legal right.'9 7 "In the absence of any action
by either prior sovereign to limit or quantify in any way the Pueblos' water
rights, the United States asserted that Spanish and Mexican law are
irrelevant to quantification of the Pueblos' present rights."'98  In other
words, Judge Mechem used the laws and recognition of the prior sovereign
to confirm the existence of the right - not the quantification of the right -
because the prior sovereigns had recognized it in full. And because the
United States recognized the rights as they previously existed, only where
the rights had been previously limited would allocation or quantification by
a prior sovereign matter. In terms of priority, this confirms that the Pueblo
were "first in time, first in right."
In defining the scope of the Pueblos' water rights under the laws of the
United States, Judge Mechem pointed to a long line of precedent
recognizing aboriginal title. "Original Indian title gives an Indian tribe the
right to exclusive occupation and use of their aboriginal land until that title
is extinguished by the United States."' 99  Outlining cases involving
aboriginal title with respect to the discovery doctrine, the canons of
construction, and entitlement to protection (regardless of whether a treaty,
statute, or government action existed), Judge Mechem concluded, "This line
of cases establishes that the Pueblos have aboriginal title, Indian rights or
original Indian rights to their lands and the use of them including
appurtenances." 20
As to the quantification of the water rights, Judge Mechem noted that
until arrival of the Spanish, the Pueblos developed and had the only rights
195. Id. at 998.
196. Newville, supra note 178, at 265 ("The special master's findings continued to
explain the flexible repartimiento system of water allocation used by both Spain and
Mexico. The system was a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding under which the
quantities allocated were never final and could be changed as needs changed. The system
attempted to balance the needs of all users.").
197. Id.
198. Bossert et al., supra note 50, at 34.
199. Newville, supra note 178, at 266.
200. Aamodt II, 618 F. Supp. at 1009.
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201to use all of the stream system's waters. On account of this aboriginal
right, the Pueblos maintained a "prior right to use all of the water ...
necessary to irrigate their lands," applying to "all acreage irrigated by the
Pueblos between 1846 and 1924.",202 In addition to priority-based rights,
"[t]he Pueblo aboriginal water right, as modified by Spanish and Mexican
law, included the right to irrigate new land in response to need," extending
federal protection to the rights as well. 2 03 "The 1924 Act, which gave the
non-Pueblos within the Pueblo four-square-leagues their first legal water
rights, also fixed the measure of Pueblo water rights to acreage irrigated as
of that date."204
This quantification of rights is referred to as the historically irrigated
acreage doctrine and has only been applied in the Aamodt case.20 S This
method of quantification applies to "water rights appurtenant to their
lands," which are "surface waters of the stream systems and the ground
water physically interrelated to the surface water as an integral part of the
hydrological cycle."206 The historically irrigated acreage doctrine is in
contrast to the practicably irrigable acreage doctrine, which is the most
common quantification standard applied by courts for the quantification of
reserved water rights.207 Courts use the practicably irrigable acreage
doctrine where lands are set aside for agricultural purposes, with the
intention to provide for both the tribes' present and future needs.208
4. Subsequent Memorandum and Orders
In 1993, the district court expanded upon Judge Mechem's previous
findings regarding quantification, and clarified the types and elements of
the Pueblos' irrigation water rights. The court outlined that the Pueblos
hold aboriginal rights, Indian reserved rights, and state law rights. 209 But
this list is not exhaustive. 210 Aboriginal irrigation water rights exist on any
lands occupied and irrigated by the Pueblos from time immemorial, and are
201. Id.
202. Id at 1010.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Bossert et al., supra note 50, at 34.
206. Aamodt II, 618 F. Supp. at 1010.
207. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3, New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt,
No. No. 66-cv-06639 (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion and Order
1993]. See generally 2 WATERS, supra note 4, § 37.02(c)(1).
208. CoHEN, supra note 46, at 1185.
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quantified by the historically irrigated acreage standard.2 1' Indian reserved
rights - those created by acts of Congress or executive orders - use the
practicably irrigated acreage standard for quantification, which allows for
future uses.212 And from the period between 1846 and 1924, where the
Pueblos' level of use exceeds the historically irrigated acreage standard,
New Mexico state water rights apply.2 13
In 2000, the district court clarified what kinds of water rights attach to
Pueblo "replacement lands,"214 or those "lands purchased with funds that
Congress appropriated in 1933 to compensate Pueblos for lands transferred
to non-Indians during the territorial period." 215 For those replacement lands
located within the boundaries of the grant lands, the aboriginal water rights
or federal Pueblo water rights apply. But where the replacement lands lie
outside the exterior boundaries and within the aboriginal territory, the
replacement lands will carry: (1) federal Pueblo water rights based on
historically irrigated acreage where a history of such can be proved; or (2)
state law water rights or replacement law where historically irrigated
acreage history cannot be proved.2 16
5. 2006 Settlement
In 2006, 40 years after the Aamodt litigation and the State Engineer's
investigation into the occupants' water rights began, a settlement agreement
was signed by the State of New Mexico, Santa Fe County, City of Santa Fe,
and the four Pueblos.217 The settlement was contingent on federal
legislative approval.2 18 Approval required approximately $292 million in
funding, divided among five governments. 2 19 The majority of the funding
was for the construction of a regional water system, which features a
pipeline to convey additional water to the area's landowners.220 In 2010,
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id. at 4-5.
213. Newville, supra note 178, at 268.
214. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6, New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v.
Aamodt, No. 66-cv-06639 (D.N.M. Apr. 14, 2000), ECF No. 5596 [hereinafter
Memorandum Opinion and Order 2000].
215. COHEN, supra note 46, at 334.
216. Memorandum Opinion and Order 2000, supra note 214, at 9.
217. See Aamodt Adjudication (Dec. 2010), supra note 153, at 4.
218. See id. at 1.
219. Aamodt Adjudication, UTToN TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES CTR., UNIv. OF N.M.
SCH. OF LAw, 100-01 (Nov. 2009), http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/WM_AamodtAdjudi
cation.pdf.
220. Aamodt Adjudication (Dec. 2010), supra note 153, at 1, 5.
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President Obama signed a bill, passed by both the House of Representatives
and Senate, approving funding for several Indian water rights settlements,
including the Aamodt adjudications. 22 1
B. Applying the Mechem Doctrine to Current Water Disputes Involving the
Five Tribes of Oklahoma
1. The Current Disputes
a) Sardis Reservoir
In 1974, the State of Oklahoma contracted with the United States for the
Army Corps of Engineers to "build [a] lake for the purpose of present and
future use water supply storage."222 The Oklahoma Water Resources Board
(OWRB) was to finance the lake (known today as Sardis Lake or Sardis
Reservoir) in 50 annual payments.223 The OWRB made its sixth annual
payment in March 1990, but later breached the contract by failing to tender
sufficient payment, prompting the United States to sue for breach of
contract.224 The district court awarded the United States $27 million in
money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.22 5 The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
226certiorari.
The first of the judgment's five installments was due on July 1, 2010.227
Unable to produce the first $5.2 million installment, the OWRB sold its
rights in the lake to the City of Oklahoma City for $42 million in June
2010.228 The City of Oklahoma City agreed to pay off the $27 million debt
to the federal government and would retain the majority of the rights in the
lake.229
221. Claims Resettlement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064.
222. United States v. Oklahoma, 184 F. App'x 701, 702 (10th Cir. 2006).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.; Complaint at 10, Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin, No. 11-cv-00927 (W.D. Okla.
Aug. 18, 2011), ECF No. 1.
226. Oklahoma, 184 F. App'x at 705.
227. M. Scott Carter, Senators Oppose OKC Plan to Buy Sardis Lake Water, J. REC.
(Okla. City), Apr. 20, 2010, available at http://joumalrecord.com/2010/04/20/senators-
oppose-okc-plan-to-buy-sardis-lake-water-capitol/.
228. John Estus, Oklahoma Water Resources Board Approves Sardis Lake Deal for





EXAMINING THE AAMODT ADJUDICATIONS
"The Choctaw, Chickasaw and Caddo Nations claim various rights to the
lake's water and wanted the Oklahoma City deal delayed until a statewide
water use study [was] completed. ... Choctaw and Chickasaw leaders
"had offered to pay the state's Sardis debt if the Oklahoma City offer was
delayed." 2 3 ' Additionally, the Governor of the Chickasaw Nation, the Chief
of the Choctaw Nation, and the Assistant Secretary of the Department of
the Interior wrote letters to the Governor of Oklahoma and the OWRB
requesting that the sale be terminated.232 The deal nevertheless went
forward.
On August 18, 2011, the Chickasaw and Choctaw nations filed a
complaint in federal court, naming the Governor of Oklahoma, the OWRB,
and the Oklahoma City Water Trust (the group acting on behalf of the City
of Oklahoma City) as defendants.233 The Chickasaw and Choctaw nations
sought "declaratory and injunctive relief to protect their federal rights -
including their present and future use water rights, regulatory authority over
water resources, and right to be immune from state law and jurisdiction." 2 34
The tribes cite the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek as the basis of those
rights.2 35
The complaint states that a fundamental element of the Storage Contract
Transfer Agreement between the OWRB and the Water Trust is a water-use
permit granting the Water Trust the right to withdraw water from the
236 tiereservoir. The tribes maintain that the issuing of permits, selling of
water, or exporting of water from the treaty territory is contrary to federal
law.237 Moreover, the tribes' "rights to and regulatory authority over Treaty
Territory water resources are prior and paramount to any water rights
claimed by or derived from the Defendants in the Treaty Territory under
state law, and federal law preempts interference with the Plaintiff Nations'
rights by Defendants."23 8
On February 10, 2012, the Oklahoma Attorney General, on behalf of the
OWRB, filed a civil petition in the Oklahoma Supreme Court requesting
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. M. Scott Carter, Fourth Reading: Sardis Issue Will Reach Boiling Point, J. REC.,
Oct. 28, 2010, available at http://joumalrecord.com/2010/10/28/fourth-reading-sardis-issue-
will-reach-boiling-point-opinion/ [hereinafter Carter, Sardis Issue].
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that the court commence a general stream adjudication for the stream
systems located within the Choctaw and Chickasaw boundaries.239 In its
petition, the OWRB recognized that the rights of the federal parties
involved may be based in federal law.240 Pursuant to the Oklahoma General
Stream Adjudication statute in conformity with the McCarran Amendment,
however, those rights are subject to adjudication in state court.24 1
Moreover, based on the significant issues of public interest and policy
relating to adjudication, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is the proper
venue, rather than the federal court.242
On Febraury 23, 2012, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the
OWRB's application to assume original jurisdiction in the general stream
adjudication. In response, on March 12, 2012, the United States
Department of Justice, representing eight named federal respondents in the
petition, removed the water rights case to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma.243 At the time this article was sent to
publication, no further developments had occurred.
b) Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods
In 2005, the State of Oklahoma sued Tyson Foods, Inc. because of
poultry waste originating from the poultry producer. The State claimed that
the waste was polluting the Illinois River Watershed, an area located within
the boundaries of Oklahoma and the tribal lands of the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma.244 "Tyson moved to dismiss the monetary claims on the ground
239. Petition of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board for a General Stream
Adjudication, Oklahoma Water Res. Bd. v. United States, No. 110375 (Okla. 2012).
240. Id. at 7-16.
241. Id. at 8.
242. Id. at 16.
243. Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma at 1, Okla. Water Res. Bd. v. United States, No. 23-cv-00275 (W.D. Okla. 2012)
("The United States of America, through its undersigned attorneys, respectfully represents
the following: The United States of America; United States Department of the Interior;
United States Bureau of Reclamation, an agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior;
United States Army Corps of Engineers; the United States on behalf of the Choctaw Nation
of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Indian tribe; the United States on behalf of the
Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Indian tribe; the United States on
behalf of the individual members of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma; and the United States
on behalf of individual members of the Chickasaw Nation.").
244. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. Okla.
2006), af'd, 619 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2010).
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that the [Cherokee] Nation was a required party that had not been
joined."2 45
In court, the State of Oklahoma countered the motion, arguing that the
Cherokee Nation was not an indispensable party.246 But outside of court,
the State of Oklahoma "negotiated an agreement in which the Nation
purportedly assigned the State its interest in the litigation."2 47 Realizing the
State of Oklahoma would not fully protect its interest in the lands, the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma sought to intervene in the dispute, as it also
claimed an interest in the land and waters at issue, based on treaties with the
United States.24 8 In 2009, the court denied the Cherokee Nation's motion to
intervene, ruling that the motion was untimely.249
2. Application of the Mechem Doctrine to the Five Tribes'Disputes
a) The Basis of the Right
Because the Five Tribes hold their lands in a way similar to the Pueblos
and decidedly distinct from that of other tribes, their lands may not be
subject to the reserved rights doctrine, but rather the doctrine set forth in the
Aamodt adjudications - the Mechem Doctrine. Therefore, as established in
the Aamodt adjudications, the Five Tribes may possess the full ownership
and regulatory control over their resources because they: (1) hold their
lands in fee; (2) are protected under the jurisdiction of the federal
government, as promised in Congress's enabling acts; and (3) hold rights to
water which have never been diminished or abrogated by an act of
Congress.
The theory that the Five Tribes' interest in their lands is equivalent to
that of the Pueblos is based on the similarities in the tribes' historical
acquisition and recognition of land. The federal government holds most
reservation lands in trust for tribes. 2 50  Federally held trust lands, or
reservations, are subject to the reserved rights doctrine. 251' But under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Pueblos were granted land patents and
therefore hold fee simple title to their lands, as opposed to the federal






250. CANBY, JR., supra note 76, at 424.
251. Helton, supra note 31, at 980-81.
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government holding them in trust.25 2  Similarly, the Five Tribes were
granted patents pursuant to their removal treaties, and therefore also hold
fee simple title to their lands.253 The Five Tribes never relinquished the
lands to the government for allotment, but instead deeded the lands directly
to their members for purposes of allotment.254 And like the Pueblos under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906 and
the Oklahoma Constitution provided for federal jurisdiction over the Five
Tribes and their property.255 Upon entry into the Union, Oklahoma took
control of the land with its then-existing status. At that time, the Five
Tribes - not the federal government - held title to their land in fee.
Therefore, on the basis of the equal footing doctrine, it cannot be said that
the Five Tribes' control of the land or natural resources passed to the State
256of Oklahoma when it entered the Union.
In its conclusion that the Pueblos held something greater than a reserved
right, the Aamodt I court regarded the Pueblos' fee simple landholdings to
be dispositive.257 Because Winters applies in instances where lands are
reserved from those encompassed within organized territories or
governments, it did not apply to the Aamodt adjudications and, therefore, it
presumably would not apply in an adjudication involving the Five Tribes of
Oklahoma. Because the Pueblos were regarded as living upon their lands
since time immemorial, well before an organized territory or state existed,
their lands did not meet the definition of reserved lands.258 Likewise, the
lands to which the Five Tribes were removed were not encompassed within
a previously existing organized territory or government. It was not until
1851, well after the removal of the Five Tribes to Oklahoma, that the
252. COHEN, supra note 46, at 322-23.
253. LAMBERT, supra note 104, at 221-22; see also TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN
CONTEMPORARY LAW, PoLCY, AND EcONOMICs 64 (John E. Thorson et al. eds., 2006).
254. See discussion supra Part III.
255. See Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, 267-70 (1906).
256. Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution provides that upon entry into the Union, a
new state is granted the same rights as any other state. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. In Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), the Court found that the equal footing doctrine
did not apply in Oklahoma with regards to submerged lands. The Court reasoned that the
submerged lands did not transfer to the State of Oklahoma upon statehood, but rather
remained with the Choctaw Nation because of the special historical origins of the Choctaw,
its treaties, and the provisions granting Indian lands in fee simple and promising freedom
from State jurisdiction. Essentially, the federal government did not have any rights in the
riverbeds to convey to the State of Oklahoma. Id. at 635-36.
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federal government adopted the policy of removing tribes to reservations
located within organized territories and states.259
While the Five Tribes did not live on the lands in the Indian Territory
since time immemorial, they received their lands in fee during the 1830s,
prior to the policy of reserved lands.260 Moreover, lands that both the
government and the tribes agreed would never be included in a territory or
state certainly cannot fit within the rubric of "reserved." Just as Judge
Mechem noted in Aamodt II, the government recognized and protected -
but did not reserve - these lands for the tribe.261
The court in Aamodt found that nothing in the Enabling Act, Trade and
Intercourse Act, or subsequent acts associated with the Pueblos after
statehood could be read as divesting the tribe of any water rights because
the acts were not explicit as to any divestiture.262 Likewise, it is established
that the Five Tribes' allotment agreements could not divest them of any
rights because lands were not surrendered to the government to disperse,
but rather were transferred directly to individual landholders.263  "The
General Allotment Act, Dawes Act, Curtis Act, Oklahoma Organic Act, and
Oklahoma Enabling Act are silent as to water rights."2" Whether the state
legislation or action was silent is of no significance. Pursuant to the Court's
holding in Winans, a tribe that holds rights based on a pre-statehood treaty
cannot be divested of those rights through state acts.265 Moreover, as noted
in Aamodt I, pursuant to the canons of construction, a congressional
divestiture must be explicit.266 Therefore, no water rights could transfer
from the tribe to any other sovereign or state by means of legislation or
state action. Instead, it may be that the Five Tribes would be considered to
hold a prior and paramount right with respect to water.
b) The Quantification of the Right
On account of the basis of the right being aboriginal title rather than
reserved rights, the Aamodt adjudications applied the historically irrigable
acreage standard. If the Five Tribes hold aboriginal title in their lands (as
did the Pueblos), the historically irrigated acreage doctrine would
259. COHEN, supra note 46, at 185.
260. See supra Part III.B.
261. Newville, supra note 178, at 260.
262. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part III.B.
264. Helton, supra note 31, at 995.
265. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905).
266. Aamodt I, 537 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1976).
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theoretically apply in the quantification of the Five Tribes' rights. Pursuant
to the historically irrigated acreage doctrine, the Five Tribes would have the
prior right to use all of the water in the water systems necessary to irrigate
their lands within the acreage that the Five Tribes irrigated from their
arrival to the Indian Territory until Oklahoma's entry into the Union.
But if the Five Tribes' right is based upon a reserved right, the
practicably irrigated acreage standard would apply. In that instance, the
Five Tribes would have prior rights to water in the amount needed to
irrigate all of their lands' practicably irrigable acreage. This is the amount
of water necessary to satisfy both the present and future needs of the
reserved lands.267
As the Aamodt adjudications established, the federal government, as
guardian of the tribes, could not relinquish its duty to govern water rights,
and federal law therefore applies to reserved and aboriginal rights.268 State
law is thus inapplicable to reserved or aboriginal rights. But like in the
Aamodt adjudications, state law applies where the tribes hold some rights in
areas outside the boundaries of the reservation. And in that instance,
Oklahoma's dual-system approach to water law would apply in quantifying
the Five Tribes' water rights.
3. The Need to Avoid Litigation
The waters in both the Sardis and Tyson disputes lie within the original
boundaries of the Five Tribes' lands, placing the disputes squarely within
the realm of a logical application of Aamodt's Mechem Doctrine. But the
Aamodt litigation and subsequent negotiations spanned more than 50 years
for one single water project. 26 9 Considering the large amount of lands held
in trust for the Indians across the western United States and the grave need
for water allocation, one can imagine how many similar and equally
complicated disputes exist. While the adjudication process sounds similar
to any other judicial determination, reaching the final stages or obtaining a
decree can take 50 years or more. 2 70 This process often leads to the parties
negotiating outside of court in an effort to come to a more timely resolution.
For this reason, the State of Oklahoma, the tribes of Oklahoma, and other
interested parties involved in Oklahoma tribal water issues should avoid
litigation at all costs. Academics, legislators, and tribal governments all
267. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963), disavowed by California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
268. See supra Part IV.A.2.
269. See supra Part IV.A.
270. See supra Part IV.A.2-3.
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appear to agree with this notion;27' however, the State of Oklahoma
continues to act without due regard for the Five Tribes' interests. Given the
number and variety of the rights-holders involved - from the non-Indian
water rights holders, to the city and state governments, to the tribes and
residents of the area - the resolution will dramatically affect each and every
user for hundreds of years to come. The state should consider the far-
reaching, burdensome effects before forcing litigation that could cost
millions in state taxpayers' dollars and decades in time.
Given their involvement with the Five Tribes' interests, the Sardis and
Tyson disputes represent two examples illustrating the Aamodt
adjudications' helpfulness in predicting an outcome and serving as an
incentive for the State of Oklahoma to include the tribes in negotiations or
to begin to recognize tribal rights in a more efficient manner. But the water
disputes between the Five Tribes and the State of Oklahoma are not the
only issues pending for the state. The Apache Tribe of Oklahoma is also
involved in a dispute between the State of Oklahoma and the City of Forth
Worth for the sale of water appurtenant to Apache tribal lands.2 72 While the
Aamodt litigation may not seem immediately applicable to the Apache's
Tribe's issues given the lack of a Five Tribes' interest, the Apache Tribe's
land is located in western Oklahoma and was previously owned in fee by
273the Five Tribes. Because of this connection, the Mechem Doctrine may
be pertinent to disputes involving the Apache Tribe's water rights (or those
of other tribes now residing within the original boundaries of the Five
Tribes).274
From applying the Aamodt adjudications' holdings to the Five Tribes'
water disputes, one can infer that, at the very least, the Five Tribes have
Winters rights and, at most, the states lack any rights at all, with the Five
Tribes holding all rights and the full and unilateral ability to regulate and
271. Carter, Sardis Issue, supra note 232; see also Neil McCaleb, Chickasaw Nation
Business Development Leader, Speaking in Professor Lindsay Robertson's Federal Indian
Law Class at the University of Oklahoma College of Law (Summer 2010) ("Litigation must
be a last resort - the parties need to come to the table and negotiate.").
272. The Tarrant Regional Water District sued the Oklahoma Water Resources Board for
refusing to approve permits whereby the water district would purchase rights in the water
appurtenant to Apache land. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. CIV-07-0045-HE,
2010 WL 2817220 at *1 (W.D. Okla. 2010). Judge Heaton, for the Tenth Circuit, found the
memorandum of understanding between the Apache Tribe and the water district to be "so
fraught with uncertainties and contingencies it did not provide the necessary basis for a
justiciable claim." Id. at *3.
273. See Work, supra note 4, at 11-15.
274. IdatII-15.
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control the water. Either characterization of rights certainly makes the Five
Tribes an indispensible party to the resolution of these issues.
V Conclusion
For Oklahoma tribes, having had neither a general stream adjudication
relating to Indian tribes nor a state that recognizes the tribes' rights in the
water, the Aamodt adjudications may play a crucial role in forecasting the
resolution of water issues currently involving the State of Oklahoma, the
Five Tribes, and the federal government. Based on the holdings in the
Aamodt adjudications and the similar histories of the Pueblos and the Five
Tribes, the Five Tribes may hold a prior and paramount right with respect to
the regulation and control of water within their lands similar to that of the
Pueblos. Aamodt's Mechem Doctrine maintains that tribes hold aboriginal
title with water rights prior and paramount to all others where the tribes: (1)
hold their lands in fee; (2) are protected under the jurisdiction of the federal
government, as promised in Congress's enabling acts; and (3) hold rights to
water which have never been diminished or abrogated by an act of
Congress. The Aamodt court already held that the Pueblos indeed have
such prior and paramount water rights, and the Fives Tribes, like the
Pueblos, fit seamlessly within the Mechem rubric, providing a legal basis
for the Five Tribes' claim that they hold greater rights than are now being
afforded - and possibly so much as a prior and paramount right to full
regulation and control of their lands' waters.
In litigation, and even in negotiations, not every party comes out a
winner. Often, even the winner walks away with less than he deserves.
From the Five Tribes' perspective, a right to future uses should be implied,
given the theory of natural progression. In other words, without the
interruption and invasion of other sovereigns, the Five Tribes, over time,
would have developed their cultivation and processes, and had all rights to
the water. But from the state's perspective, the land falls within Oklahoma
Territory and is subject to the Oklahoma Constitution, based upon the equal
footing doctrine. Both sides must consider that based on the adjudication of
similar disputes in the court system, litigation will provide the least efficient
means, with respect to both time and money, to solve these disputes.
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